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1.  Introduction 
 
The European Union and its member states have adopted aggressive targets for rates of renewable energy 
adoption and energy efficiency improvements by 2020. These 20/20/20 goals were justified by a trifecta of 
arguments for energy security, greenhouse gas emissions reduction, and economic competitiveness. 
Competitiveness in particular was taken to mean not only insulation from volatile fossil fuel prices, but also 
the protection and promotion of global comparative advantage for EU firms specialising in so-called 'green 
goods.' These EU-level goals were mirrored, and in many cases led by, member state policy that justified 
subsidies for the expansion of renewable energy markets at home as support for export-led growth abroad. As 
a result, the energy sector now receives the kinds of industrial policy support that the neoliberal policy 
consensus had made unthinkable for other sectors. Like earlier rounds of industrial policy, 'green growth' was 
to deliver improved productivity and new jobs in rising sectors, this time with the added bonus of ecological 
stability.  
The return to industrial policy raises persistent questions of whether and when states can effectively sponsor 
the creation or competitiveness of new industrial sectors. This paper tests one aspect of this debate: whether 
state support for renewable energy can, on its own, grow new 'green' industrial sectors, or whether those 
sectors emerge from complex constellations of related industrial expertise. We find support for the argument 
that state support for renewable energy industries at home can develop export competitiveness abroad. But 
that support appears to work best when the domestic economy already has the constellation of skills, 
industries, and institutions that act as precursors to the creation of new 'green' industrial sectors. Subsidising 
the expansion of renewable energy markets at home can help support the repurposing of these skills for 
renewable energy goods. But it does not necessarily create these skills or capabilities anew. Thus 'green 
growth' faces the same set of challenges that industrial development has always faced. That the goods in 
question are 'green' does not solve the underlying problem of how to best structure skill and capital formation 
so as to provide durable comparative advantage in competitive world markets. 
2.  Infant industries and incomplete information: industrial policy and its 
discontents 
 
The 'green growth' debate is not new. Rather, it merely extends an ongoing argument over whether state 
sponsorship of certain sectors or industries can actually stimulate economic growth. Advocates of state 
action have claimed that a range of economic externalities interfere with the establishment of new industries, 
and justify state support in the name of economic development. Taken together, these externalities justify 
so-called 'Hamilton-List' interventions that support industries through the initial period of development. But 
those opposed to any kind of state support can point to numerous examples of state intervention that cost 
too much, gained too little, or distorted economic development into obsolete or inefficient sectors.  
Advocates of targeted intervention into new sectors typically couch their arguments in terms of supporting 
high-growth 'infant industries.' This Hamilton-List infant industry argument assumes that due to externalities 
or imperfect capital markets a pure market solution (i.e., no government intervention) would keep the infant 
industry underdeveloped compared to its socially optimal size.  
Three primary externalities are commonly cited. First, the learning-by-doing hypothesis provides a strong 
argument—one found often in the green growth literature—for why markets alone may fail to provide for the 
socially optimal development of new industries. New firms in new industries generate substantial knowledge 
simply by participating in the sector—so-called 'learning by doing.' Following Lucas (1993), learning is the 
by-product of applying labour and capital to new production processes. Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) 
highlight the importance of entrepreneurs exploring in which sectors an entire country might be competitive 
on the international market. But this kind of activity generates spillover benefits that the first-entrant firms 
can’t internalise. These externalities include the education of the (mobile) labour force, difficult to protect 3 
 
process innovation, or simply demonstration effect knowledge—proof that something can in fact be done. 
The inability to internalise these benefits leads to under-development of industry for a variety of reasons: 
firms are reluctant to generate benefits for competitors; capital markets may be reluctant to invest in 
untested ideas; and labour may be reluctant to invest in new skills for industries whose viability remains 
unverified. These effects can lead to under-development of new sectors compared to socially optimal levels.  
Cluster externalities create a second justification for state intervention in infant industries. In brief, first 
entrants to a new sector might provide the seeds for widespread productivity improvements from which they 
only partially benefit. As Rodriguez-Clare (2007) shows, these clustered externalities take two forms. 
Marshallian specialisation externalities can create complementary patterns of firm specialisation that 
increase productivity across the value chain.
1 Jacobian externalities arise from the productivity-improving 
benefits of competition between firms in the same sector. Marshallian specialisation can help create a 
competitive value chain, while Jacobian specialisation can improve the productivity of each link in that chain 
(van der Panne and van Beers, 2006).
2 Thus, the initial investors in an infant industry might be providing the 
nodes for a new cluster. If the company cannot entirely internalise the corresponding benefits, the individual 
level of investment will be suboptimal.  
Finally, pure economies of scale may create a third externality that leads to under-investment by potential 
new market entrants. For industries with severe scale efficiencies, only one or a few companies might enjoy a 
natural monopoly rent in the global market.
3 A strategic game for entry in this market would arise. 
Governments could be interested in engaging in such strategic rivalries to help their domestic companies as 
the domestic social benefit of attracting such an industry might exceed the private benefits of the 
corresponding investor (Brander and Spencer, 1985).  
Each of these externalities would argue for welfare-enhancing state intervention. If private markets under-
invest because of the inability to fully benefit from the learning, clustering, or social externalities that those 
investments would create, government subsidy could correct this market failure. Done appropriately, state 
interventions at the sectoral level could theoretically be welfare enhancing from a national perspective.  
What counts as 'appropriate' drives to the heart of the debate over industrial policy. Various government 
policies to support infant industries have been proposed: creating domestic demand through obligations or 
public procurement; subsidising R&D, investments or even production; provision of targeted public goods 
(education, infrastructure); export subsidies; and import restrictions. All these policies incur economic cost.
4 
And they all require picking a sector to support, choosing the duration of support, and deciding on the volume 
of support. Economic literature indicates that for political-economy reasons governments often support the 
wrong sectors, too long and with too much money.
5  
Consequently the classic trade-off between government failure and market failure arises. On the one hand, 
the 'Mill Test' asks whether the protection or subsidy can eventually lead to a sector capable of surviving 
                                                             
1   Rodriguez-Clare (2007): 'Clusters arise in the presence of Marshallian externalities, which signifies that firms benefit 
from the production and innovation activities of neighboring firms in the same and related industries'. But 
'Marshallian externalities are not an intrinsic characteristic of an industry: the same industry could generate 
Marshallian externalities in one place and not the other, in one stage of its evolution and not another.' 
2   'In a recent review of the evidence, Rosenthal and Strange (2004) conclude that an important component of ME is 
knowledge spillovers, which are obviously stronger for knowledge intensive industries.' (quoted from Rodriguez-
Clare, 2007). 
3   The classic example is aviation, where two firms—Boeing in the United States and Airbus in the European Union—
comprise the bulk of the commercial jet aviation market. Both firms and governments have recently suffered 
setbacks at the World Trade Organization for unlawful state aid, albeit of different forms. 
4   For instance, Frankel and Romer (1999) show that protecting domestic industry from foreign competition can 
deprive domestic economies of the gains from trade.  
5   On the impossibility to pick winners Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2007) argue that the asymmetric appropriability of 
rents implies that losers lobby harder and are thus more likely to receive subsidies than winners, the opposite of the 
preferred outcome. Earlier explanations include the protection for sale argument by Grossmann and Helpman 
(1994) and the ‘social insurance’ explanation of Hillman (1989).  4 
 
international competition without aid. On the other, the 'Bastable Test' argues that the aid is only justifiable if 
the discounted future benefits from the supported sector exceed the present cost of support (Corden, 1997). 
Some general findings of the literature evaluating development strategies suggest that 'export led growth' 
strategies that target interventions to potentially exporting industries have worked better than 'import 
substitution' strategies.
6 There is, however, no consensus whether infant industry protection was the primary 
causal factor in successful cases of export-led growth.
7 
Much of the success of state support appears contingent on different national economic and policy contexts. 
But the literature on the effectiveness of infant industry interventions has rarely given formal consideration 
to such initial conditions. This is understandable, as initial conditions encompass a universe of potential 
variables that make each case look idiosyncratic.  
Recently, the 'product space' literature has provided a way of abstracting this multidimensional problem in a 
constructive way. Hausmann and Klinger (2006) and Hidalgo et al. (2007) proposed to visualise how several 
sectors cluster together with respect to their coinciding export competitiveness. Hausmann and Klinger 
(2006) suggested that a country’s location within the global product space can indicate how easily they may 
move into new sectors. Countries competitive in one sector may find moving into export markets in closely 
related sectors easier than in distant sectors. For instance, moving from one kind of textile product to another 
may be much easier than from textiles to industrial chemicals. The reasons for this could be manifold and 
difficult to disentangle. But, the presence of 'close' sectors can be supposed to be a good proxy for the 
existence of favorable initial conditions for the development of a corresponding sector (see section 4). 
3.  The 'green goods' sector as an exceptional infant industry 
 
Environmental goods—so called 'green industries'—are equally subject to this set of arguments for and 
against state support of markets. These industries comprise technologically sophisticated traded goods like 
wind turbines or solar cells, are subject to intense international competition, and display many of the 
externalities—most notably learning-by-doing
8—that feature in standard arguments for state support.  
But in addition to these features, 'green goods' also occupy sectors prone to severe environmental or security 
externalities. This is particularly true for climate change mitigation goods like renewable energy, which are 
not presently cost-competitive with fossil fuels unless these externalities are somehow priced in. Thus there 
are good reasons to believe that 'green goods' are even more susceptible to under-investment compared to 
the social optimum than environmentally undifferentiated infant industries. As Unruh (2000, 2002) and 
Acemoglu et al. (2009) have argued, these externalities may lock out climate change mitigation goods unless 
overcome via concerted state action.   
Apart from the environmental problems this lock-out poses, states have recently become concerned that 
lock-out will also deprive them of comparative advantage in new 'green' industries. So-called 'green growth' 
has taken its cue from successful exporters of green goods, like Denmark or Germany.
9 The German Ministry 
                                                             
6   According to de Melo and Robinson (1992), '[Westphal (1978); Westphal, Kim, and Dahlman (1985)] believe that 
infant-industry protection, export promotion, and intervention was at the heart of ELG.' Other proponents of this view 
are Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik (2006). 
7   According to de Melo and Robinson (1992), [Balassa and Associates (1982), Balassa (1985), Bhagwati (1988), 
Krueger (1985), Little (1982) and Noland and Pack, (2003)] claim that a relatively neutral set of incentives across 
activities, which promotes allocative efficiency, accounts for the superior performance of ELG. 
8   See the large literature on 'learning/experience curves' for renewables (eg Jamasb, 2007). 
9   The popular and policy arguments on green growth span a wide range of economic, environmental, and social 
concerns. A sampling of four categories demonstrates this diversity: 
1.  Keynesian demand stimulus for short-term job creation via deficit-financed investment in energy efficiency and 
energy infrastructure  
2.  Improved trade competivieness via reduced exposure to terms-of-trade pressures from fossil fuel imports, 
particularly petroleum and natural gas 5 
 
for the Economy attributes 280,000 new jobs and €31 billion in turnover to the renewable energy sector as of 
2008.
10 The Danish Wind Industry Association cites the wind sector as responsible for 8.5% of all Danish 
exports, 24,000 jobs, and €7 billion in turnover.
11  These tangible economic benefits may come alongside 
reduced dependence on energy imports and reduced domestic pollution. They have also helped sustain 
enthusiasm for green energy and emissions reduction.
12 These cases have enabled governments to 
rationalise state investment in 'green' industries on job creation and competitiveness, as well as 
environmental grounds.  
The European Union was an early leader in appealing to economic growth and competitiveness to rationalise 
state support for 'green' renewable energy industries and markets. The European Commission, in its 1997 
energy white paper, appealed to the export advantages that Europe could capture via early sponsorship of 
renewable energy.
13 This was followed shortly by a 1998 report from the European Parliament, which 
asserted the potential for 'exporting technology and services for the use of renewable energy' and stressed 
'the competitive advantages currently enjoyed by European producers thanks to high technology and hence a 
more favourable export position in competition with the USA and Japan', but bemoaned the 'a definite lack of 
effective aid, in particular for small and medium-sized enterprises'. To remedy this gap, the Parliament 
'[called] on the Commission to draw up a study of the foreign trade implications for the EU of support for 
renewable energies'.
14   
This early appeal to export competitiveness was later echoed in the European Union energy directives and 
their binding targets for renewable energy use in the EU. The 2001 renewable energy directive (2001/77/EC) 
explicitly stressed 'export prospects' in justifying the 12% renewable electricity penetration target for the 
EU15 countries by 2010. That target was followed by the 20% target for the EU-27 established in the 2009 
Climate and Energy Package and echoed in the Europe 2020 manifesto.
15 The 2009 documents established 
three justifications for renewable energy: greater security of supply, reduced greenhouse gas emissions, and 
improved national competitiveness in 'green' energy technologies.
16 Competitiveness has arguably become 
even more important since these directives passed, given the renewed competition from the United States 
and China. Commissioner for Energy Günther Öttinger argued for increased European spending on 
decarbonisation technologies by stating that 'in global competition we need to avoid that we start lagging 
behind China and the USA.'
17 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
3.  Increased innovation in response to greater administrative constraint, otherwise known as the 'Porter 
Hypothesis'  
4.  Revealed comparative advantage through promotion of export sectors in high-value renewable energy markets 
  Note that these justifications exist apart from whether, as the Stern Report (2007) argued, investment in emissions 
reduction today is justified on the basis of potentially very high costs from unmitigated climate change in the future. 
Avoided costs are not the same as tangible benefits, either for current living standards or for the political economy of 
policy sustainability. 
10   'Im Jahr 2008 erzielte der Sektor einen Inlandsumsatz von rund 31 Milliarden Euro und zählte rund 280.000 Brutto-
Beschäftigte.' [BMWi 2010]. 
11   Danish Wind Industry Association, 'Annual Statistics 2010' at www.windpower.org/en/knowledge/statistics.html 
12   Eg, for Germany, the 2010 report on the economy reiterates the idea that environmental protection and economic 
growth can go hand in hand: 'Gerade für Deutschland als Vorreiter bei den erneuerbaren Energien und 
Energieeffizienz gehen Wohlstandsmehrung und Umweltschutz Hand in Hand, wenn das klimapolitisch Notwendige 
so ausgestaltet wird, dass es auch energiepolitisch sinnvoll ist sowie Wachstum und Beschäftigung Rechnung trägt.' 
[BMWi 2010]. 
13   European Commission (1997). 
14   On 15 May 1998 the Parliament authorized the Committee on External Economic Relations to draw up a report on the 
new prospects of the European Union in exporting technology and services for the use of renewable energy. 
15   European Commission (2010). 
16   'Meeting our energy goals could result in € 60 billion less in oil and gas imports by 2020. This is not only financial 
savings; this is essential for our energy security. [...] Meeting the EU's objective of 20% of renewable sources of 
energy alone has the potential to create more than 600 000 jobs in the EU. Adding the 20% target on energy 
efficiency, it is well over 1 million new jobs that are at stake.' (The European Commission, 2010) 
17   Speech of Commissioner Oettinger at ENERI 2010, Belgian Presidency Conference on Infrastructure of Energy 
research. Brussels, 29 November 2010. 6 
 
4.  Testing the green growth hypothesis 
 
Under what circumstances might these justifications for infant industry support to 'green' industries hold? 
Can competitiveness and economic growth really justify subsidy of 'green' goods on their own, in addition to 
the environmental goods they provide? To analyze whether industrial policy motives for renewable electricity 
generation technologies could be considered as a valid motive for renewable energy support schemes, we 
proceed with two different analyses. First, we show that 'green' products do not comprise any unique 
category, but are instead different products that reside in different parts of the product space. This motivates 
looking into the different technologies separately. We then investigate three aspects of the effectiveness of 
state aid: 
1.  Does state aid to green energy correlate with the size or scope of domestic markets for 'green' 
energy goods? 
2.  Does the size of domestic markets for green or renewable energy—themselves opportunities for 
'learning by doing'— correlate with international competitiveness in markets for renewable energy 
goods? 
3.  Does competitiveness in green energy goods grow out of earlier patterns of competitiveness in 
related sectors?  
(1) and (2) reflect the link, implied by policymakers in the EU and elsewhere, between government support 
for domestic market growth and international competitiveness. (3), in contrast,  tests an alternate 
hypothesis: that the ability to grow into competitive positions in global markets for 'green' goods is in fact 
contingent on pre-existing structures of the domestic economy, rather than simply just the size of one’s 
domestic 'green' goods market. If true, that would suggest that using policy to create new 'green' sectors in 
the absence of favourable initial conditions might prove difficult and expensive.
18 
To establish whether and how export competitiveness in renewable energy industries relates to broader 
economic factors, we need two measures: one, of global competitiveness, and two, of the economic factors 
themselves. Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) provides a standard and straightforward way to 
measure the relative competitiveness of economies on world export markets.
19 To move from broad 
observations on trade patterns to cleanly specified arguments about policy intervention and economic 
change, we follow Hidalgo et al. (2007) in defining a global product space that captures relationships 
between trade patterns for different products. The product space allows us to formalise and quantify 
networks of related products and track the evolution of those networks over time. Furthermore, consistent 
with Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009), we can view the product space as representation of the underlying 
economic factors that influence competitiveness. Since green products like solar cells and wind turbines 
come into global markets later than hypothesised supporting sectors, we can watch the emergence of global 
trade in these products and its relationship to pre-existing patterns of industrial competitiveness that reveal 
information about the economic capabilities of individual countries.  
Subject to the limitations of the state aid data, we find limited support for the relationship between state aid 
and market size. But market size and competitiveness are highly correlated, particularly for wind turbines. In 
contrast, global competitiveness in solar cells appears to depend more heavily on pre-existing structures of 
economic competitiveness.  
                                                             
18 Consequently, we are able to check different pieces of the argumentation chain that indicates that (i) support 
schemes drive renewables deployment, (ii) deployment encourages a domestic supply of the technology, (iii) via 
learning-by-doing and other externalities, the domestic technology supply improves its global competitiveness and 
(iv) the state support schemes eventually lead to a prospering renewable technology sector that increases the net 
welfare.
 
19   For a survey and references on other measures see http://www.mpsge.org/qtool/competitiveness.pdf 
 7 
 
4.1.  Defining the global product space 
 
Consistent with Hidalgo et al. (2007), we define the product space as the matrix P, containing the proximities 
 between goods i and j. The proximity is the conditional probability that a country that exports good i 
also exports good j. We define exporting to mean a revealed comparative advantage RCAi of greater than 1.  
Formally, we define the revealed comparative advantage for country c in good i as  
      ( 1 )  
Thereby,   is the export of good i by country c. Consequently, the RCA measures, whether a country exports 
more of good i relative to its total exports, than the share of good i in global exports. Given the RCA values for 
countries c and goods i, we compute the proximity matrix as 
           ( 2 )  
            ( 3 )  
Equation 3 generates a symmetric proximity matrix of dimension n×n, for n globally traded goods. The 
proximity is the conditional probability of being competitive in good j given that a country is competitive in 
good i. Consistent with Hidalgo et al. (2007), we take the minimum of  and  to ensure 
that countries which are sole global exporters for some good do not dominate the calculation of proximity 
values.  
The product space provides a latent representation of the relationships between competitiveness in different 
sectors. How exactly those relationships should be characterised remains the subject of some dispute. Earlier 
analysis of industrial policy in the filiere tradition emphasised the importance of strategic sectors—as 
opposed to skills or capital or other abstract factors—for comparative advantage.
20 In that tradition, the 
product space was sometimes taken literally: if sector A was proximate to sectors B, C, and D, then a country 
wishing to be competitive in sector A should be in the other sectors as well.  
Empirical tests of this interpretation proved uncertain. We prefer a more general interpretation of the product 
space: that in addition to strategic sectors that might play a role for certain products (eg, the value chain in 
the petrochemical industry) also represents a network of products that require similar kinds of expertise, 
factor inputs, firm networks, infrastructure, and institutions.
21 The later interpretation suggests different 
priorities for economic development. Instead of an emphasis on individual sectors, it implies an emphasis on 
developing the ability of the economy to move into modes of production other than those it currently 
occupies.  
                                                             
20   For an overview of the filiere tradition, see Kaplinsky and Morris (2001).  
21   Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009) call this a set of 'capabilities', the diversity of which—as measured by the density of 
a country’s competitiveness around some of set of goods—can represent a set of capabilities that can be redeployed 
in service of other goods.  
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This reading is broadly consistent with two more recent strains of political economy literature. The Varieties of 
Capitalism analysis argues that the categories of production countries specialise in are linked, not to specific 
historical expertise in one or several sectors, but to the institutional relations among labour, capital, and 
government; and the kinds of skill and capital formation those relations encourage (Hall and Soskice, 2001). 
Likewise, the analysis of the small states of northwestern Europe—Denmark in particular—emphasises the 
institutional ability to reallocate labour and capital among closely related but highly exposed sectors on the 
basis of factor formation, not prior specialisation (Katzenstein 1985). 
4.2.  Data 
 
We use the six-digit product data (HS-6) from the United Nations COMTRADE database, for years 1990-2009.
22 
At the six-digit level, it becomes possible to identify a range of products that can be classified as 'green'. 
Based on their ability to help reducing carbon emissions we define green products in the following categories: 
solar cells; wind turbines; nuclear power plants and parts thereof; and electric meters.
23 
The use of 6-digit data does not permit restriction of the goods that classify the product space as all 6-digit 
products are needed to span the entire product space.
24 Hierarchical clustering of the proximity matrix does 
not reveal a set of unrelated goods that can be excluded from the resulting product space.  
For the purposes of constructing the green product space, we calculate the proximity matrices for years 
2005-2009 and average the results across the set of products common to all years. This provides some 
means to mute short-term fluctuations in trade patterns.
25 
4.3.  Properties of the product space 
 
The product space was constructed by averaging the proximity matrices for the years 2005-2009. Figure 1 
shows the Minimum Spanning Tree of the global product space as defined by p > 0.5, as calculated by 
Kruskal’s algorithm.
26 The Minimum Spanning Tree (MST) provides a visual representation of the product 
space matrix. If we define each product as a node in a tree, and the distances (i.e., inverse proximities) 
between products as the length of the branches, then the MST chooses a tree connecting all the nodes such 
that the sum of the length of the branches is minimised. Thus the MST for the product space illustrates the 
products space using the highest-proximity connections between products. The result is a representation 
that privileges close connections between products as measured by their conditional probability of export, 
and helps represent how products cluster with their neighbors in the product space. 
                                                             
22   Hidalgo et al. (2007) use 4-digit trade data to construct their product matrix. However, the 4-digit data do not allow 
us to identify green products in the global trade space. 
23   The HS-6 codes are, respectively, 854140; 850231; 840140; 840110; 902830; and 902890. 
24   At the 4-digit SITC product classification Hidalgo et al. (2007) find that only 775 of the 1006 goods represent the 
entire product space. 
25  Even without this averaging, the product space remains very stable over time. Spearman rank tests of the correlation 
between the proximity vectors for green goods over time return positive correlations with p-values of zero, indicating 
that patterns of proximity are relatively constant. Likewise, tests on a random sample of 50 products from the 
proximity matrix return the same result. These highly significant correlations between ranks over time suggest 
stability to the overall structure of the product space. For each year in the period 2005-2009, despite both changing 
trade patterns and a changing set of reporting countries, the character of the proximity between green goods and 
their conventional counterparts remains quite similar (see Figure 11 in the Appendix). This provides some 
confidence that the observations that follow are not based on the idiosyncratic choice of dates.    
26   Kruskal’s algorithm provides one of several means for efficient computation of minimum spanning trees. See 
Kershenbaum and van Slyke (1972) for a comparison of different methods.  9 
 
Darker links indicate closer proximities between nodes. Clustering of major product categories is clearly 
visible, particularly for textiles. Consistent with earlier work, the MST shows significant distance between 
clusters of expertise in industries like textiles and food production on the one hand; and high-value-add 
manufacturing, transport, and chemicals on the other. As Hidalgo et al. (2007) argued, this suggests the 
difficulty of moving an economy’s comparative advantage from one sector or cluster of sectors to another. 
The product space provides an abstract representation of the set of characteristics–capital and skill 
formation, infrastructure, production networks, and retained expertise–that shape what that country can 
competitively produce and export. The separation of textiles and machine tools in the product space is a 
projection of their significant separation in a multidimensional space comprised of a range of political and 
economic variables that determine national comparative advantage. In the next section we are zooming into 
the positioning of green products in the product space. 
  10 
 
Figure 1: Minimum Spanning Tree for the product space defined by the HS-6 data in years 2005-2009. The 
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5.  Results 
 
In this section we show that the analysed data are not inconsistent with the view that: (5.1) green 
technologies are not a product class of its own and different technologies must thus be analysed separately, 
(5.2) deployment of renewable electricity generation was linked to state support, (5.3) competitiveness in 
some renewable generation technologies is linked to the domestic market size, (5.4) Historic 
competitiveness in the corresponding and adjacent sectors co-determines current competitiveness. 
5.1.  Green products in the product space 
 
We first zoom into the MST around green products. Figure 2 shows the detailed product space surrounding 
solar photovoltaic cells and nuclear plant parts. The annotations indicate the products represented by nodes 
proximate to the green products themselves. The results are not surprising: solar cells are proximate to other 
sophisticated microelectronics and integrated circuit parts; nuclear power plant components are proximate to 
sophisticated metallurgical technologies and scientific apparatus.  
We are interested in how the local properties of the product space for green goods compare to those of the 
product space as a whole. Figure 3 suggests that green goods are very different in their levels of integration in 
the product space. If we define density around a given good as the sum of other goods within some proximity 
threshold value, then the density of green goods at different threshold values varies widely. Nuclear reactors 
are poorly integrated, suggesting they require a range of specialised capabilities weakly linked to broader 
patterns of industrial production. In contrast, electric meters are very highly integrated into the product 
space, and exist in dense local networks. The other goods are distributed around the mean, with wind turbines 
significantly less well-integrated than the mean, and solar cells in general better-integrated. However, all 
goods lie within the middle 95% quantile of the data, even if their distribution around the mean is significantly 
different from the entire population. 
  12 
 
Figure 2: The local product space for solar cells and nuclear power plant parts. 
 
(a) The local solar cell product space 
 
(b) The local nuclear power plant parts product space 
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Figure 3: Density of proximity values in the product space. Points represent the count, for each product, of 
adjacent goods within some proximity threshold. Green products are shown in colored lines. Error bars show 
the 95% confidence intervals around the mean for each threshold. 
 
 
Thus the product space itself suggests that green products are not much different from their non-green 
counterparts. They show similar proximity to other products in their same product classification; the 
distribution of proximity values between green products and the rest of the product space is about that of the 
product space as a whole, with some products being disproportionately more isolated; and the products most 
proximate to green products in the Maximum Spanning Tree representation display clear sectoral 
relationships. Consequently, we cannot treat the six 'green products' as a group but have to analyze them 
individually. In the course of the subsequent analysis we will focus on the two technologies for generating 
electricity from renewable sources (RES-E): wind turbines and solar cells. 14 
 
5.2.  Hypothesis 1: State support and the market for renewable energy 
 
To achieve the national renewable energy targets set forth in the 2009 Climate and Energy Package, each EU 
member state has developed a different policy mix. Policy tools include, but are not limited to, 'green 
certificates', 'feed-in tariffs', obligations, direct subsidies, preferential grid access regulations and tax breaks. 
Due to the use of different fiscal, parafiscal and non-fiscal instruments the actual size of the state support for 
RES-E is very difficult to assess. A measure of total state aid for environmental protection collected by the EU 
Directorate-General for Competition – a very imperfect indicator for RES-E support – hints to large 
divergences inside the EU. In 2009, total state aid for environmental protection amounted to 1.1 % of EU-27 
GDP. But Germany spent over twice that—2.4%—while Italy spent only 0.12%.
27 Consequently, the national 
systems for RES-E support in Europe seem to differ, both in structure and in size. 
Figure 4: Correlation between state aid and total consumption of renewable energy. State aid reported for 
2004-2009 by the Directorate-General for Competition and is normalised within countries to 2005. Annual 
consumption is reported in tonnes of oil equivalent for solar and wind energy by the Eurostat and is similarly 




If the relative scale of state support had an impact on the speed of deployment, we should observe that in 
recent data on market size. Figure 4 shows the correlation between cumulative environmental state aid and 
domestic production of renewable electricity from solar or wind. Cumulative state aid—even in so imperfect a 
measure as in the DG Competition data—correlates with greater domestic production of renewable energy. 
But this is true only for wind energy, not for solar. Two explanations may hold here. First, the imperfect 
measures of state aid used here may not correctly capture all forms of aid that go to solar versus to wind. 
                                                             
27   In comparison to electricity consumption, the distribution is equally wide. The member states of the EU27 spend a 
total of €13 billion on environmental aid and consume about 3000 TWh, or about 0.004 bn Euros / TWh. For Germany 
this ratio is 2.5 times higher and for Italy 16 times lower. 15 
 
Second, wind energy is presently cheaper than solar in most European countries.
28 Thus state aid for generic 
renewable energy may favour adoption of wind over solar purely on the basis of market price.  
The unexpectedly low correlation between environmental state aid and deployment—particularly for solar 
photovoltaics—may be explained by the fact that environmental state aid is no perfect proxy for the actual 
state support to renewables. When including non-fiscal support (eg grid connection obligations) and 
excluding non-renewables expenditures (eg ecosystem restoration) the interaction would probably be 
stronger. As the deployment of solar panels in Germany and the low share of wind in total generation in the UK 
suggest, the deployment is mainly driven by support and not the availability of sites. Furthermore, given the 
that wind and solar energy nearly always cost more than fossil fuel alternatives, market size may be a good 
proxy for the harder-to-measure question of state support.  
5.3.  Hypothesis 2: Market size and global competitiveness 
 
The Listian or infant industry argument suggests that countries should support domestic markets as a 
precursor to developing internationally competitive firms to supply those markets. Section 5.2 showed that, 
for wind energy in particular, market size does reflect state aid to renewable energy sectors. If learning-by-
doing constitutes a substantial asset in the development of firm competitiveness, then state subsidies for 
market expansion in the initial learning period could overcome barriers to the establishment of internationally 
competitive firms.  
Here, we test whether that argument holds in the case of wind or solar energy production systems. If the 
argument holds, we might expect that countries with larger domestic markets for wind or solar energy would 
display greater competitiveness in world markets for wind turbines or solar cells. Two measures of capacity 
are used: either the raw market size, measured in billions of kilowatt hours generated per year; or the relative 
market size, as a percentage of overall electricity production. The absolute market size may provide a better 
measure of pure demand for renewable energy-related capital. To the extent that we believe that 
competitiveness contains a significant learning-by-doing component, which domestic market expansion 
supports, then absolutely larger domestic markets may matter more. However, it may also be that the 
relative contribution—in percentage terms—better reflects the commitment of any given nation to domestic 
market development. Absent a better theory of exactly how market size relates to competitiveness, we show 
both outcomes. 
Once again, the wind sector responds to state aid more readily than solar. Figure 5 shows the relationship 
between revealed comparative advantage in wind turbines or solar cells, plotted against the domestic 
capacity for wind or solar electricity production. Table 1 provides the equivalent regression results for the 
relationship. The reader will note that relationship between competitiveness in wind turbine markets and the 
size of the market doesn’t vary much whether relative or absolute measures of market size are used. In 
contrast, we find no relationship between market size and solar cell competitiveness for relative measures of 
the domestic solar energy market, but a marginally significant relationship when the market is measured in 
absolute terms.  
While these numbers cannot be considered causal, they do point out that the size of domestic wind energy 
markets—whether measured in absolute or relative terms—is a much better predictor of global 
competitiveness in wind generation technology than in the solar energy sector. A Listian strategy of domestic 
market expansion in service of greater overseas competitiveness thus appears better suited to the wind 
industry. 
                                                             
28   Historical feed-in tariff rates for wind and solar have reflected this. Both Germany and Spain, for instance, had much 
more generous tariffs for solar electricity, reflecting higher capital costs for solar cells. In the budget austerity that 
followed on the 2008-2009 financial crisis, these tariffs proved unsustainable and have been cut back substantially. 16 
 
Exactly why this should be the case is unclear. One hypothesis, is that solar cells are more easily traded and 
therefore more prone to import competition than wind turbines. Thus given generous feed-in tariffs or other 
subsidies, countries may end up importing solar cell modules rather than purchasing them from domestic 
firms. Anecdotal evidence supports this argument. Germany is a net importer of solar cells. In 2009, Germany 
appears to have purchased approximately $18 billion in solar cells, of which $9.5 billion were imported, 40% 
from China. Meanwhile, Germany exported only $4.6 billion worth of solar cells.
29 Thus even though Germany 
was relatively competitive on world markets, its domestic support scheme was strong enough to draw in 
global imports. Something similar occurred in California in 2009-2010, when federal stimulus dollars for 
renewable energy investment appear to have purchased largely Chinese solar cells.  
In contrast, wind turbines are difficult to ship, particularly in their newest, very large incarnations. The 
relatively higher cost of shipping and logistics may lead companies and countries to locate wind turbine 
production close to the point of installation, leading to greater development of domestic capacity and greater 
competitiveness on foreign markets.  
An alternative hypothesis concerns skill formation. Solar cells use relatively common semiconductor 
manufacturing techniques, performing medium-value-add processes to standard and readily available inputs. 
In contrast, wind turbines contain significant tacit knowledge that has grown up via learning-by-doing 
processes, and draw on a range of sophisticated manufacturing techniques, materials, and supply networks. 
This difference in the skill and knowledge content of the two products may make solar cell production 
relatively easier to move to low-cost production centers compared with wind turbines.  
 
  
                                                             
29   Calculations based on numbers provided by the UN COMTRADE statistics for total imports and exports, and BSW 
(2010) for domestic German production. 17 
 
Figure 5: Fitted values and 95% confidence intervals for the regression of RCA on market size for both wind 
and solar electricity. Data on wind and solar electricity generation are taken from the Energy Information 
Administration as either billions of kWh or percent of total electricity generation. RCA values are computed 
from the UN COMTRADE data. All data are panel data for the period 1996-2008. Confidence intervals are 
estimated by bootstrapped standard errors clustered on country. 
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Table 1: Coefficients from the OLS regression of RCA in the wind or solar sector on the size of the domestic 
wind or solar electricity market. All data are by country, from the period 1996-2008. Confidence intervals are 
computed via bootstrap, clustered at the country level. Figure 5 shows the equivalent relationships and 
confidence intervals. 
Market Size Measure  Intercept  Slope CI, 95%, Intercept CI, 95%, Slope 
Wind, pct. elec.gen  -0.305 0.588 -2.739 1.604 0.258 0.866 
Wind, bn kwh  -3.145 0.615 -3.972 -2.519 0.375 0.801 
Solar, pct.elec.gec  -1.354 -0.028 -4.108 1.618 -0.315 0.268 
Solar, bn kwh  0.002 0.265 -0.931 0.792 0.058 0.447 
 
5.4.  Hypothesis 3: Path-dependent emergence of green industries 
 
We saw that expanding domestic markets—possibly as a result of state aid—correlates with the 
development of export competitiveness in some sectors. This kind of correlation is broadly consistent with 
the economic policy arguments made in section 3, which explicitly link support for domestic markets in 
renewable energy goods to competitiveness in those goods abroad. But, for solar cells in particular, market 
size could not explain observed patterns of competitive advantage. Furthermore, consistent with Hidalgo et al 
(2007), we would not expect countries to simply launch entirely new sectors solely on the basis of expanding 
domestic markets. Other factors must have played a role for the location of this relatively new industry.  
All forms of economic production carry with them skill and knowledge content. Moving into new sectors is 
made easier by competence in closely related industries, whose solutions to capital formation, skill 
development, firm relations, and other economic issues can be easily adapted to the new production chain. In 
the case of our 'green sectors', we want to understand whether prior expertise in 'supporting sectors'—those 
closely related in skill or content to 'green sectors'—can predict patterns of global competitive advantage in 
wind turbines or solar cells. This generates the following hypothesis: countries with historically strong 
supporting sectors for green goods will do better in green industries than those without.  
We test this hypothesis by developing a measure of the strength of a country in the sectors supporting 
competitiveness in the 'green good'.  This supporting sector strength       is defined as the number of 
products close to the 'green good' with an RCA > 1. Closeness is defined as the proximity between the green 
and the other product (according to equation 3) being below some proximity threshold P. Countries that are 
more competitive in more goods proximate to our 'green goods' therefore display higher supporting sector 
strength. Formally, for each country c in year y,  
     , ,  = ∑     , ,  >1             ,           (4) 
We test whether the pattern of global competitiveness in good green in 2008 that’s not explained by that 
same pattern in 1996 is correlated with      ,    . To do this, we first regress         ,     on 
        ,    . We then test the correlation between the variance not explained by this regression and the 
supporting sector strength      ,    . Formally, we correlate the residuals from this regression with the 
strength of the supporting sectors, measured as the count of supporting sectors in a given country with RCA 
values greater than 1, for either wind turbines or solar cells. If our hypothesis holds, then knowledge of how 
countries compete in supporting sectors for 'green' products should improve our ability to predict future 
competitiveness in the 'green' sector itself.  19 
 
This approach provides some means of controlling for persistent patterns of competitiveness in green 
sectors. We would expect patterns of competitiveness in a given industry to persist over time. If we were to 
ignore this and correlate today’s patterns of competitiveness in green sectors with earlier patterns of 
supporting sector competitiveness, we might overestimate the importance of supporting sectors. Using only 
the residual variance in present green sector competitiveness provides some means of controlling for these 
persistent patterns. Note that this approach will not identify the importance of the supporting sector to 
maintaining comparative advantage in green goods over time. It only looks at whether changes in 
competiveness are correlated. Thus this is an implicitly conservative measure of the importance of 
supporting sector strength.  
Figure 6 and Figure 8 show the relationship between past and present competitiveness in wind turbines and 
solar panels. Consistent with expectations, national competitiveness is quite persistent over time. , 
competitiveness is quite persistent with correlations of 0.62 for solar and 0.40 for wind. 
Figure 7 and Figure 9 show the correlation of the remaining variance from that regression with the historic 
pattern of competitiveness in the green sector.  For photovoltaics the competitiveness in supporting sectors 
in the past can partly explain the current strength in solar cells. For wind turbines this relation is also positive 
but not significant. 
30  




Figure 7: shows the correlation between the remaining variance and the density of a country’s export 
competitiveness in proximate products in 1996. OLS regression overlaid in red with 95% CI. 
                                                             
30   Note that the 2008 data were used because they comprise a larger set of countries than the 2009 data, which were 
still incomplete at the time of this analysis. This should not affect the proximity values, as it would take country trade 
out of both the numerator and denominator of the RCA values. 20 
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Figure 9: shows the correlation between the residual variance and the density of a country’s export 
competitiveness in proximate products. OLS regression overlaid in red with 95% CI. 
 
 
Table 2 and Table 3 quantify the correlations between present competitiveness in green sectors and each of 
these two measures. Table 2, corresponding to the data in Figure 6-9, shows that success in green goods is 
highly and significantly correlated with the density of a country’s competitiveness in goods proximate to the 
green good in the product space. Table 3 shows that countries with historic strengths in goods proximate to 
the green good in the product space are more likely to later develop competiveness in the green goods 
themselves.   
Table 2: Spearman rank correlation tests for the relationship of 2008 RCA values for green goods with the 




Wind turbines  0.40  0.06 
Solar cells  0.62  0.00 
 
Table 3: Spearman rank correlation of residual variance of 2008 RCA values for green goods with earlier 
competitiveness in supporting sectors. Supporting sectors are defined as goods with proximity to the green 
good of 0.3 or higher. Earlier competitiveness is defined as count of those goods for which a country had an 
RCA > 1 in 1996. Residual variance is taken from the log-log regression of 2008 RCA on 1996 RCA. 




Wind turbines  0.29  0.17 
Solar cells  0.39  0.00 
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It is possible that the higher responsiveness on supporting sector strength of solar compared to wind is an 
artifact of the data. There are far fewer globally competitive exporters of wind turbines. As noted above, these 
turbines have traditionally been harder to ship than solar cells due to their size. Thus the data represent a 
fairly small sample of global economies, which will dilute the strength of correlations. Furthermore, the two-
step approach (i.e., first eliminating the effect of past competitiveness and then correlating the residual to 
the current sector strength) might have unintended consequences. Consequently, we proceed with jointly 
testing the effects at the end of this section. 
Several outliers deserve mention. Spain (in wind) and Portugal (in solar cells) have both achieved RCA levels 
above those we would expect from their performance in supporting sectors.
31 Spain aggressively promoted 
renewable energy as both an environmental initiative and an economic development strategy. Portugal 
engaged in significant energy market reforms at EU behest, in addition to more aggressive national measures 
(Rosenthal 2010).  
For wind turbines in particular, Figure 7 and Figure 9 would suggest that these proactive policy measures 
have pushed these countries’ revealed comparative advantage in wind turbines much higher than nations 
with comparable supporting-sector RCA values. Indeed, both countries are on par with levels of 
competitiveness achieved by Denmark and Germany, which appear to have much stronger supporting 
sectors. However, as both Spain and Portugal have encountered fiscal difficulties in the aftermath of the 2008 
financial crisis, they have begun to withdraw or scale back ambitious green energy industrialisation 
programs. Whether these industries can now survive in the absence of either significant state support or 
strong surrounding networks of firms and capabilities remains unclear. 
But Germany and Denmark remain the most successful European examples of using state support to develop 
internationally competitive firms in renewable energy industries. Yet they did so on the basis of historically 
strong supporting sectors in engineering, high-precision machining, and manufacturing. Their aggressive 
promotion of domestic markets for wind and solar energy built atop these existing foundations. 
Finally, we test whether all three effects—domestic market size, historical competitiveness in the green 
sector, and competitiveness in the supporting sectors—together yield similar results. We use logistic 
regression of the form
32: 
 
        ,     = +           ,     +        ,     +               
 
Here, RCAgreen has been transformed into a binary variable coded as 1 if the RCA was greater than 1, and 0 
otherwise. Countries reporting no RCA in the green sector were treated as having an RCA of zero—equivalent 
to no export of the green good in question.      ,     as introduced in equation 4 is the number of products 
close to the corresponding green good with an RCA greater one.             is the absolute size of the 
market for the corresponding green good. 
Table 4 and Table 5 show the results for both regressions. In both cases, supporting sector strength was 
found to have a significant effect on future competitiveness in 'green' sectors. We can thus confirm the earlier 
correlation result that early competitiveness in the supporting sector is a good predictor for current 
competitiveness in the 'green sector'. The fact that this relationship is also significant in the case of wind 
points is reassuring. Furthermore, consistent with the findings in section 5.3, market size—itself a proxy for 
state aid—supporting domestic competitiveness in wind turbines but not solar cells.  
Table 4:  Logistic regression of wind sector competitiveness on prior competitiveness, supporting sector 
strength, and domestic market size. Dependent variable was coded 1/0 based on RCA > 1 decision rule.  
                                                             
31   Portugal appears as an outlier in the 2008 data, but not in 2005-2007 or 2009. 2010 data is not yet available. 
32   Due to the limited data availible we are unable to include interaction terms that would allow formally testing if state-
support is most efficient if supporting sectors already exist. 23 
 
  Estimate  Std. Error z value p-value  Sig. level
Intercept -5.33  1.36 -3.93 0.00 99.9%
RCAwind, 1996  10.33 3956.18  0.00  1.00   
RCAss  0.04 0.02 2.37 0.02  95.0% 
MktSize  54.14 20.29 2.67 0.01 99.0%
 
Table 5:  Logistic regression of solar sector competitiveness on prior competitiveness, supporting sector 
strength, and domestic market size. Dependent variable was coded 1/0 based on RCA > 1 decision rule. 
  Estimate  Std. Error  z value  p-value  Sig. level 
Intercept  -3.26 0.61 -5.36 0.00  99.9% 
RCAsolar, 1996  -0.98 1.10 -0.89 0.37   
RCAss  0.03 0.01 3.70 0.00  99.9% 
MktSize  -244.50 376.10  -0.65  0.52   
 
Finally, we note that these correlations depend heavily on the threshold value used to construct the 
supporting sectors (see Figure 11 in the Appendix). As the proximity threshold increases, the number of 
adjacent products included in the supporting sector falls rapidly. With that decrease comes a decrease in 
countries that report exports for those products. The overall drop in the number of sectors and countries 
results, by threshold sizes of 0.5, in very small sample sizes (on the order of 10 countries and 4-8 products). 
A threshold value of 0.3, used to produce the data in Figure 6 -9, provides a reasonable sample of the local 
product space around each of the goods in question. 
6.  Discussion 
 
We were able to find various conditions that correlate with the development of a competitive advantage in 
solar cells and wind turbines. To different degrees, market size, early presence of the sector and the presence 
of supporting sectors is correlated with future competitiveness. With the available data, strict causality or an 
assessment of the interaction of the individual effects is hard to establish. However, we are able to show that 
the data are not inconsistent with the view that: (1) state support triggered market size expansion, (2) 
building on past strength in the corresponding sector and adjacent sectors this market size expansion 
triggered the development of global competitiveness. 
Consequently the examination of the product space and its historical development suggests that developing 
export competitiveness in RES-E turns out to be as problematic and path-dependent as for other goods. 
Moving into sophisticated engineering and manufacturing industries like photovoltaics or wind turbines 
requires significant physical and human capital assets, production know-how, and firm expertise. Successful 
countries in green products today are either those who were successful in the past; or those who moved into 
those sectors from positions of strength in closely related sectors.  
EU policy is predicated on the idea that expanding domestic markets for renewable energy will contribute to 
the establishment of competitive advantage in world markets. Hence the implied link between the pursuit of 
binding targets for renewable energy in the EU member states and spillovers for the competitiveness of 
European firms in world markets. But as we have seen competitiveness is about more than just domestic 
markets. Rather, competitiveness depends on the economy’s ability to marshal complex sets of skills, capital, 
supply chains, infrastructure, and institutions to achieve high productivity.
33 Thus we may not expect that 
                                                             
33   For example the work of Porter (2000) suggests that clusters advance through four dimensions (1) strong and 
sophisticated local demand; (2) a local base of related and supporting industries exist in the local economy to 
support the export industry; (3) favorable factor (resource) conditions; (4) a competitive climate driving firm 
productivity. 24 
 
expansion of domestic markets alone, as EU energy policy anticipates, will create competitiveness in 
renewable energy industries, let alone growth.
34  
These findings pose challenges for the goal of using renewable energy policy to generate growth across the 
member states. The diversity of economic structures, institutions, patterns of economic production, and 
other factors informs against the idea that the Danish and German successes are widely replicable. Instead, 
the emphasis on renewable energy promotion as the primary means to de-carbonise the economy may 
reinforce pre-existing patterns of competitiveness. This has implications for European economic policy. The 
support of renewable electricity generation in Europe may create a larger market for competitive producers 
but not necessarily lead to the development of a competitive industry in the installing country. Therefore, it 
may even reinforce existing disparities between the member states.  
However, anecdotal evidence at least suggests that while EU countries should not all expect to become 
leaders in green technology as a result of the renewable energy standard, they may obtain spillover benefits 
from those that do. Examination of the Vestas supply chain shows that, while production is centered in 
Denmark, significant components of the generator, blades, control systems, and towers are sourced from 
elsewhere in Europe.
35 The improvement of the common market for energy-related products should improve 
the competitiveness of existing firms in green energy markets, and in doing so improve the prospects for their 
supplier networks throughout Europe.  
Figure 10 shows the rather substantial differences that exist in the strength of the supporting sectoral 
networks for wind and solar technology across the EU the US and China. So if industrial policy makers are 
'doomed to choose' (Hausmann and Rodrik, 2006) than existing strength in supporting sectors suggest that 
choosing solar will be a less obvious choice for Denmark or Poland than it might be for the Czech Republic or 
Hungary. 
  
                                                             
34   We abstain from analysing the link between the green sector and the entire economy. We only note that developing 
competitiveness in a set of sectors using policy instruments might at worst hinder growth by artificially shifting 
production factors from more to less productive sectors. 
35   See Husted (2006).  25 
 





To be clear at the end, our study does not imply that renewable support passes the Bastable Test. We make 
no claims about whether state aid to renewable energy industries will generate sectors capable of repaying 
the costs of state intervention. Rather, we only argue that the chance of passing this test is higher—and thus 
the case for industrial policy stronger—in countries with stronger pre-existing conditions for success in these 
industries. That claim should lead to skepticism that 'green growth' can, as the EU and other policy actors 
argue, come primarily through the mechanism of expanding domestic markets for green goods.  26 
 
7.  Conclusions 
 
Clearly this does not tell the entire story of developing export competitiveness in green goods. Further work is 
needed on the interaction of the different drivers for competitiveness; the complementarity or 
substitutability of links between green goods and different products; the evolution of green sectors over time; 
the role of cross-border value chains in spreading growth externalities from green industries in one country to 
supporting sectors in neighbouring countries; and the impact of the support for renewable energy on internal 
growth and not just export competitiveness.  
But this work does suggest limits to popular arguments that link greater domestic consumption of green 
goods to export-led growth. Those countries that have done so successfully—Denmark and Germany first 
among them—started from highly advantageous domestic positions and achieved first-mover advantages. 
Second-tier followers, particularly in eastern Europe, will face intensified overseas competition and domestic 
economies lacking many of these advantages. Improved markets for low-emissions energy may aid 
greenhouse gas reduction and energy security. But the case for coupling these gains to economic growth via 
improved export competitiveness will – if ever – only be adequate for selected economies. 
  27 
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9.  Appendix 
 
Figure 11: Density of proximity values to six green products over time. The green product space is averaged 
over the global product space estimates for 2005-2009. Presented separately, the proximity density to the 
green products varies relatively little over that period, suggesting that averaging helps mute volatility but 
does not fundamentally change the composition of the product space. 
 